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Refining Pennsylvania's Standard for
Invalidating a Non-Competition
Restrictive Covenant When an
Employee's Termination Is Unrelated to
the Employer's Protectible Business
Interest
Kurt H. Decker*
Remember I have done thee worthy service, told thee no lies,
made thee no mistakings, serv'd without or grudge or
grumblings.1
I. Introduction
Today, employers are more concerned than ever about
safeguarding their protectible business interests that relate to
special skills,2 customers,3 processes,4 trade secrets, inventions,6 etc.
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1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, Act I, ii. 246.
2. See, e.g., Hayes v. Altman, 266 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1970) (restrictive covenant of
optometrist's employee upheld that limited competition for three years within six
miles of office and city).
3. See, e.g., Rapp Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Baldree, 597 N.E.2d 936 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992) (proprietary interest in employer's clients may be found permitting
enforcement of restrictive covenant, where, by nature of business, employer had
near permanent relationship with its clients and but for employment, employee
would not have had contact with them, or where former employee learned trade
secrets or acquired other confidential information while in the employer's employ
and subsequently attempted to use it for the employee's benefit).
4. See, e.g., SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244 (3d Cir. 1985)
(non-standard information used in designing systems, which could not be
ascertained by study of marketed system, entitled to protection).
5. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Kimball International, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 778 (Ind. Ct.
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Due to increased employer concern over the expansion of
individual employee rights and the at-will employment relation-
ship's abrogation,7 employers must now consider refining existing
App. 1994) (former employer's customer and supplier lists and pricing information
for its veneer products were protectible as trade secrets where the information was
not readily ascertainable through proper means by other persons and former
employer took reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933)
(employee who, during employment, conceives and perfects an invention for which
he or she obtains a patent, must, under the Shop Right Doctrine, accord to the
employer a nonexclusive right to use the invention). Generally, the Shop Right
Doctrine provides that an employee who uses the employer's resources to conceive
an invention or to reduce it to practice must afford the employer a nonexclusive,
royalty-free, non-transferable license to make use of the invention, even though
the employee subsequently obtains a patent of the invention. See KURT DECKER
& H. T. FELIX II., DRAFTING AND REVISING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS, § 3.70
(1991) [hereinafter DECKER & FELIX, CONTRACTS].
7. The at-will employment relationship permits either the employee or the
employer to end the employment relationship at any time, for any or no reason,
with or without notice. See R. COVINGTON & KURT DECKER, INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL, chs 1, 6 (1995). See generally KURT DECKER,
A MANAGER'S GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE PRIVACY: LAWS, PROCEDURES, AND
POLICIES (1989); KURT DECKER & H.T. FELIX, II, DRAFTING AND REVISING
EMPLOYMENT HANDBOOKS (1991); KURT DECKER, DRAFTING AND REVISING
EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND HANDBOOKS (1994); KURT DECKER, EMPLOYEE
PRIVACY FORMS AND PROCEDURES (1988); KURT DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY
LAW AND PRACTICE (1987); KURT DECKER, HIRING LEGALLY: A GUIDE FOR
EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS (1999); KURT DECKER, THE INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS PRIMER (1991); KURT DECKER, PRIVACY IN THE
WORKPLACE (1994); L. LARSEN & P. BOROWSKY, UNJUST DISMISSAL (1985); H.
PERITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW (3d ed. 1992). As Professor Peritt notes:
The most significant employment law development in the last quarter of
the twentieth century has been the erosion of the employment-at-will rule
and the recognition of a family of common law doctrines protecting
employees against wrongful dismissal. Under these wrongful dismissal
doctrines, terminated employees may be able to recover damages when
they can show that their termination violated employer promises,
jeopardized clear public policies, or, sometimes, when the termination did
not comport with good faith and fair dealing.
These doctrines, or exceptions to the employment-at-will rule, were
virtually unknown before 1970. Until then, an employer could dismiss an
at-will employee for any reason or no reason, confident that the law
provided the employee no remedy- unless one of a handful of statutes
prohibiting discrimination was violated. Now, the three wrongful
dismissal doctrines, more than a score of federal statutes, and scores of
state statutes provide legal redress where employees can show that their
dismissals fit within the factual circumstances covered by the doctrines or
the statutes.
PERITr, supra, at 3.
Some courts have indicated that they are not institutionally capable of
formulating or implementing a workable policy to address the needs of employees
and employers involved in at-will employment terminations and that this is best
left to the legislative process. For example, some Pennsylvania courts have taken
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methods or finding new alternatives for safeguarding their
protectible business interests.
Restrictive covenants are increasingly relied upon by
employers to secure their protectible business interests.8 Employers
generally use two types of covenants for these purposes. These are
the non-disclosure and non-competition covenants.
The non-disclosure restrictive covenant limits the
dissemination of an employer's protectible business information by
the former employee. This information may consist of trade
secrets, inventions, confidential business practices, price lists,
formulas, marketing strategies, etc. unique to the employer's
business.
A non-competition restrictive covenant typically prohibits
competition by a former employee for a specified time period
within a designated geographical area. This covenant may be used
to prevent the employee from exploiting customer contacts
established during employment or working for a competitor.
Although this covenant may be useful in deterring unfair
competition between businesses, courts have historically viewed it
as a trade restraint that prevents a former employee from earning a
livelihood.9
Employers often mistakenly understand the restrictive
covenant's proper use. They may use these covenants without
observing their legal requirements."° Courts are not hesitant to void
this position to limit the abrogation of the at-will employment relationship and
confine its change, if any, to the legislature. See, e.g., Veno v. Meredith, 515 A.2d
571, 579 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d
830, 841 (Pa. Super Ct. 1986); Darlington v. General Elec., 504 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa.
Super Ct. 1986); see also Kurt Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania after
"Banas" and "Darlington": New Concerns for a Legislative Solution, 32 VILL. L.
REV. 101 (1987); Kurt Decker, At-Will Employment: Abolition and Federal
Statutory Regulation, 61 U. DET. J. URBAN L. 351 (1984); Kurt Decker, At-Will
Employment in Pennsylvania-A Proposal for its Abolition and Statutory
Regulation, 87 DICK. L. REV. 477 (1983); Kurt Decker, At-Will Employment: A
Proposal for its Statutory Regulation, 1 HOFSTRA LAB. L. F. 187 (1983).
8. See KURT DECKER, COVENANTS NOT To COMPETE (2d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter DECKER, COVENANTS]; see also COVENANTS NOT To COMPETE: A
STATE BY STATE SURVEY (B. Malsberger, ed., 2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter
Malsberger, COVENANTS].
9. See Central Monitoring Service, Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 516 fn.7
(S.D. 1996) (determination of whether restrictive covenant is reasonable under the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS requires balancing of interests of
employer, employee, and public and involves analyzing whether restraint is no
greater than necessary to protect employer's legitimate interests, is not unduly
harsh and oppressive to the employee, and is not injurious to the public).
10. See Comment, Employee Restrictive Covenants: Unscrupulous Employees
v. Overreaching Employers, 27 S.D.L. REV. 220 (1982). To be enforceable, the
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these covenants when not properly drafted to protect legitimate
business interests." Employers are not guaranteed that a court will
modify an existing covenant to make it comply with the law."
Therefore, it is important that employers understand the proper use
and drafting of these covenants.
13
A restrictive covenant will not always be enforced even if it is
supported by valid consideration and reasonably limited in time
and area.14 The employer must also show that a protectible business
interest exists and that the limitation on the employee is no broader
than necessary to safeguard the employer's protectible business
interest involved. 5  In addition, other factors involving "blue
penciling,'" judicial divisibility, 7  as written,8  and statutory
current or former employer must show that the restrictive covenant is: (1) in
writing; (2) made part of an employment contract; (3) based upon reasonable
consideration; (4) reasonable both as to time and territory; and (5) not against
public policy. See Nalle Clinic Co. v. Parker, 399 S.E.2d 363 (N.C. App. Ct. 1991).
Often, one or more of these essential elements for enforcement is absent. See, e.g.,
Hartman v. W.H. Odell Associates, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 912 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)
(five-year duration of restrictive covenant was unreasonable in view of broad
territory covered by clause); Statesville Medical Group v. Dickey, 418 S.E.2d 256
(N.C. App. Ct. 1992) (enforcement of restrictive covenant that prohibited
endocrinologist from competing with medical group for two-year period within
one county would violate public policy, as it would eliminate fee competition by
granting two-year monopoly to medical group, would impede patients' access to
their physician of choice, and would impair their ease of access to second opinion);
See DECKER, COVENANTS, supra note 8 at §§ 3.1-3.5; see also infra notes 33-78 and
accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., George S. May International Co. v. International Profit
Associates, 628 N.E.2d 647 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (restrictive covenants covering
former employees of business consulting firm over broad and unenforceable as
beyond what was necessary to protect employer's legitimate business interests).
12. See, e.g., Amstell, Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 443 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. App. Ct. 1994)
(court may not blue-pencil or re-write restrictive covenant ancillary to an
employment contract to make it enforceable).
13. See DECKER, COVENANTS, supra note 8, at ch. 6.
14. See id. at ch. 4.
15. See, e.g., In re Golden Distribs., Ltd., 128 B.R. 352 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(dismissing claims based on restrictive covenants that lacked any protectible
interest where employer failed to allege that any confidential information, trade
secrets, or proprietary information had been misappropriated by the former
employees).
16. See, e.g., Klick v. Crosstown State Bank of Ham Lake, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 85
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) ("blue pencilling" involves removing the unreasonable part
of the restrictive covenant to determine if it can still be enforced); see also infra
note 80 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Mason v. Thomas W. Briggs & Co., 297 S.W. 1106 (Ky. 1927)
(judicial divisibility involves re-writing the covenant by removing the offensive
provision, for example, limiting enforcement to one state); see also infra notes
81-84 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., WelcomeWagon, Inc. v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955) (no
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prohibitions 9 may be used by courts to modify or invalidate the
power of covenants to protect the employer.
In Pennsylvania, restrictive covenants are enforceable if: (1)
they are incident to an employment relationship between the
employee and employer; (2) the restrictions imposed by the
covenant are reasonably necessary for the employer's protection;
and (3) the restrictions imposed are reasonably limited in duration
and geographic extent. Courts have broad powers to modify the
restrictions imposed on the former employee to include only those
restrictions reasonably necessary to safeguard the employer's
protectible business interests. In determining whether to enforce
the covenant, the court must balance the employer's protectible
business interest that the employer seeks to safeguard against the
employee's interest of being able to earn a livelihood in his or her
chosen profession, career, trade, occupation, etc.
23
Today, an additional court inquiry is present when a
Pennsylvania employer terminates an employee and seeks to
enforce a non-competition restrictive covenant. The court will
examine why the employer terminated the employee.2 ' Through
this court inquiry, the employer will find its reasons for terminating
an employee weighed against its protectible business interest to
determine enforceability.25  Even though the non-competition
covenant is found valid regarding consideration, it still may not be
enforced because the employer's termination reasons do not relate
directly to a protectible business interest. 6 For the non-competition
modification of restrictive covenant; it must be judged as written); see also infra
notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16601-16602 (West 1992) (restrictive
covenants are contrary to public policy and are void); see also infra notes 87-89 and
accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
21. See John G. Bryant Co. v. Sling Testing & Repair, Inc., 369 A.2d 1164 (Pa.
1977) (upheld salesman's restrictive covenant of three years in sales territory of
company (three states) to established customers of employee); Morgan's Home
Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 136 A.2d 838 (Pa. 1957) (upheld only to extent of
soliciting existing customers).
22. See Morgan's Home Equip. Corp., 136 A.2d 838 (upheld only to extent of
soliciting existing customers).
23. See All-Pak, Inc. v. Johnston, 694 A.2d 347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997);
Insulation Corp. of America v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995);
Thermo-Guard, Inc. v. Cochran, 596 A.2d 188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
24. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d 729 (in determining the reasonableness of
enforcing a non-competition restrictive covenant between an employee and
employer upon the employee's termination, the reason for the termination of the




covenant to be enforceable when the employer terminates the
employee and no protectible business interests are found, the
employer may have to offer the employee additional consideration
at the time of original employment, during employment, or when
employment ends in exchange for the non-competition covenant.
27
This article reviews how Pennsylvania employees may now
have greater freedom in employment choices when non-
competition restrictive covenants are sought to be enforced by
employers who have terminated them. Employees and employers
must understand how a court balances the employer's termination
reasons, the employer's protectible business interests, and the
employee's ability to earn a livelihood when scrutinizing a non-
competition restrictive covenant's enforceability.' To analyze the
court's additional inquiry's impact upon the enforcement of non-
competition covenants when employees are terminated, the
following are discussed: (1) restrictive covenant requirements; 2 (2)
enforcement approaches of courts; ° (3) employer termination
reasons as a basis for not enforcing a non-competition covenant,31
and (4) refining the court's standard for not enforcing non-
competition covenants when employers terminate employees. 2
II. Restrictive Covenant Requirements- General Principles
Where statutorily permitted,33 employers can prevent former
employees from competing with them or disclosing confidential
information through valid contractual restrictions' or where a duty
of loyalty exists.35 A restrictive covenant is generally used to
27. See id.
28. Seeid.
29. See infra notes 33-78 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 90-149 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 150-179 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16601-16602 (West 1992) (restrictive
covenants are contrary to public policy and are void); see also infra notes 87-89.
34. See, e.g., DECKER, COVENANTS, supra note 8, at §§ 3.1-3.4; 14 WILLINSTON,
CONTRACTS § 1643 (3d ed. 1972); 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1394 (Supp. 1989).
35. See EMPLOYEE DUTY OF LOYALTY: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (S.
Manela & A. Pedowitz eds., 1995) [hereinafter Manela & Pedowitz, DUTY OF
LOYALTY]. In addition to the duties expressly undertaken by an employee in an
oral or written employment contract, the common law imposes an implied duty of
loyalty upon the employee to the employer. In general, the employee is not
permitted to undertake or participate in activities adverse to the employer's
interests during the course of employment. Some courts have broadly described a
breach of the duty of loyalty as any act contrary to the employer's interests. See id.
The duty of loyalty is breached when: (1) an employee competes with the
present employer; (2) an employee solicits the employer's customers or diverts its
[Vol. 104:4
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safeguard the employer's protectible business interests from
disclosure and competition.
To be enforceable, the restrictive covenant must be definite,
must contain its terms in clear, certain language36 to safeguard a
protectible employer business interest,37 and must be supported by
valid consideration. 8 The covenant must also be reasonably limited
in scope (time and place),39 and not harmful to the public.4° Absent
business; (3) an employee lures away co-workers or former co-workers to a
competing enterprise; (4) an employee fails to disclose to the employer matters
which are adverse to the employer and which impair the employee's fulfillment of
the duty of loyalty; (5) an employee takes undisclosed payments from a third party
who is doing business with the employer; or (6) the employee divulges the
employer's confidential information to others. See id.
The law is clear that an agent owes a duty of loyalty to his or her principal.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387-98 (1958); see also Gussin v.
Shockey, 725 F. Supp. 271, 274 (D. Md. 1989), affd, 993 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.) ("The
fundamental duties of an agent include the duty not to put himself in a position
where his own interests may conflict with interests of his principal"). An
employee's duty of loyalty to the employer is based upon agency principles. See
Koch v. Cochran, 307 S.E.2d 918 (Ga. 1983); Duane Jones Co., Inc. v. Burke, 117
N.E.2d 237 (N.Y. 1954); Santa Monica Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Rossier, 109 P.2d
382 (Cal. App. Ct. 1941); Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v. Cox, 50 N.Y.S.2d
643 (N.Y. Cty. Sup. Ct. 1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra, §§ 393-
96.
The employment relationship is one of trust, confidence, and loyalty. See Las
Luminarias of the New Mexico Council of the Bland v. Isengard, 587 P.2d 444
(N.M. App. 1978); see also Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 609 F. Supp.
467 (D.C. Cal. 1985); Williams v. Pilgrim Turkey Packers Inc., 503 P.2d 710 (Or.
1972); O'Neal v. Employment Security Agency, 404 P.2d 600 (Id. 1965); World-
Wide Fish Products, Inc., 100 A.D.2d 81, (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). After
employment ends, an employee generally is free to use the skills he or she learned
with the former employer, as long as no confidence is violated. See J.P. Miller Co.
v. Madel, 575 P.2d 1321 (Mont. 1978).
36. See American Equip. Serv., Inc. v. Evans Trailer Leasing Co., 650 F. Supp.
1266 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (oral restrictive covenant unenforceable).
37. See Willis v. Dictograph Sales Corp., 54 N.E.2d 774 (Ind. 1944) (upheld
one-year time restraint within specific territory where employee had worked);
Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. Mason, 289 S.W. 295 (Ky. 1926) (upholding covenant
that covered same area in which employee had worked); see infra notes 43-50 and
accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., In re Monoghan, 141 B.R. 80 (Bkr.E.D. Pa. 1992) (offer of re-
employment constituted adequate consideration for restrictive covenant that was
executed in connection with the re-employment); see infra notes 51-71 and
accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 351 A.2d 250 (Pa. 1976) (upholding
restrictive covenant of paper manufacturer's salesman that restricted competition
for two years in specific area); see infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Gordon v. Landau, 321 P.2d 456 (Cal. 1958) (court upholding
restrictive covenant in which salesperson agreed not to solicit former customers for
one year after employment termination); Gordon v. Wasserman, 314 P.2d 759
(Cal. 1957) (validating restrictive covenant because it did not prevent former
employee from conducting the same or any other business).
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any of these requirements, former employees are free to pursue
their occupations and trades at any time, in any place, for any
reason, and for any person they choose,41 unless they breach a duty
of loyalty.42
A. Protectible Interest
Employers may not use restrictive covenants merely because
they think they are a good idea, to intimidate employees, to
discourage employees from looking for employment elsewhere, or
from working with employers that the current employer does not
favor.43  An enforceable covenant must safeguard a protectible
employer business interest.44  Interests that can be protected
through covenants include trade secrets,45 confidential inform-
ation,46 nearly permanent customer relationships, goodwill, and
unique or extraordinary skills. 9 If the covenant is for some other
purpose, for example, eliminating competition or maintaining a
proprietary interest in one's customers, the covenant will not be
enforced."
41. See, e.g., Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Associates, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 912 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1994) (five-year duration of restrictive covenant unreasonable in view of
broad territory covered by clause).
42. See Manela & Pedowitz, DuTY OF LOYALTY, supra note 35.
43. See DECKER, COVENANTS supra note 8, at § 6.2; see also supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
44. See id. at ch. 4.
45. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Kimball International, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 778 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994) (former employer's customer and supplier lists and pricing information
for its veneer products were protectible as trade secrets where the information was
not readily ascertainable through proper means by other persons and former
employer took reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy).
46. See, e.g., SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244 (3d Cir. 1985)
(non-standard information used in designing system which could not be
ascertained by study of marketed system entitled to protection).
47. See, e.g., Rapp Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Baldree, 597 N.E.2d 936 (I11 App.
Ct. 1992) (proprietary interest in employer's clients may be found permitting
enforcement of restrictive covenant, where, by nature of business, employer had
near permanent relationship with its clients and but for employment, employee
would not have had contact with them, or where former employee learned trade
secrets or acquired other confidential information while in the employer's employ
and subsequently attempted to use it for the employee's benefit).
48. See, e.g., Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. Mason, 289 S.W. 295 (Ky. 1926)
(advertising company entitled to uphold restrictive covenant that covered same
area in which employee had worked).
49. See, e.g,. Hayes v. Altman, 225 A.2d 670 (Pa. 1967) (restrictive covenant of
optometrist's employee upheld that limited competition for three years within six
miles of office and city).
50. See, e.g., Statesville Medical Group v. Dickey, 418 S.E.2d 256 (N.C. App.
Ct. 1992) (enforcement of restrictive covenant that prohibited endocrinologist
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B. Valid Consideration
Consideration is crucial for a restrictive covenant's
enforcement, whether the covenant is entered into prior to, during
employment, or after employment ends." To be valid, the covenant
must be given in exchange for something, either some benefit to the
employee or some detriment to the employer. 2
There need not be separate consideration for each provision in
an employment contract. If there is consideration for the contract,
there is consideration for each provision within it.53 Initial employ-
ment,54 additional compensation," a new employment benefit," or
change in the employee's status from at-will employ-ment to
employment for a term with termination for some form of cause"
from competing with medical group for two-year period within one county would
violate public policy, as it would eliminate fee competition by granting two-year
monopoly to medical group, would impede patients' access to their physician of
choice, and would impair their ease of access to second opinion).
51. See DECKER, COVENANTS, supra note 8, at § 3.3; see also Gregory Jordan
& Mary Hackett, Non-Compete Agreements and Consideration - What's an
Employer to do?, 57 PA. B. Q. 76 (1996).
52. See, e.g., Davis & Warde, Inc. v. Tripodi; 616 A.2d 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (employment contracts containing restrictive covenants, which were entered
into by employees subsequent to their employment, contained sufficient
consideration to support covenants where employees were offered continued
employment with new responsibilities, were given cash payment, new severance
package, and guarantee of certain job benefits); but see National Risk
Management, Inc. v. Bramwell, 819 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (continuation of
employment was not sufficient for restrictive covenant even though employment
relationship was terminable at-will).
53. See Sarnoff v. American Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1986)
(choice of law provision in corporation's incentive plan need not have been
supported by separately stated consideration; consideration for contract supports
all provisions within it); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 80(2) (1979).
But see Sheline v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 948 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1991) (the
restrictive covenant and the severance compensation clause were mutually
dependent promises that unenforceability of one necessarily rendered the other
unenforceable for lack of consideration; i.e. the restrictive covenant must be
supported by independent valuable consideration).
54. See, e.g., Ruffing v. 84 Lumber Co., 600 A.2d 545 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(taking of employment sufficient consideration to support restrictive covenant).
55. See, e.g., Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324
(9th Cir. 1980) (initial employment sufficient consideration to support restrictive
covenant).
56. See, e.g., Wainwright's Travel Serv., Inc. v. Shmolk, 500 A.2d 476 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985) (giving an employee an ownership interest in the business
adequate consideration to support restrictive covenant).
57. See, e.g., Phone Connection, Inc. v. Harbst, 494 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1992)
(continued employment for indefinite time period provides sufficient
consideration to support restrictive covenant).
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are examples of consideration that will support a restrictive
covenant.
Generally, commencing employment is sufficient consideration
to support the restrictive covenant." It may, however, not be
sufficient if the employee can be terminated at-will." Some courts
have held that the consideration; i.e., the right to be employed, is
illusory when the employer can terminate the employee with or
without notice, at any time, for any or no reason.6° An employment
agreement based on illusory consideration will not support a
covenant.6 The same rationale applies to nominal consideration.62
Continued employment presents special problems when the
restrictive covenant is introduced into the employment relationship
sometime after employment has commenced. Although some
courts have held that an employer's continued agreement to pay the
employee can constitute valid consideration for the employee's
restrictive covenant,63 especially if the employee cannot be
terminated at-will, other courts maintain that continued employ-
ment can never be the sole consideration given in exchange for a
covenant, at least not if the employee is already bound to a definite
employment termi' Because the employee has a prior right to be
employed, simply continuing this right does not provide anything
new. For there to be valid consideration, the employer must give
the employee something new in addition to continued employment,
65for example, more money, greater responsibility,' or a new
58. See, e.g., Capital Bakers v. Townsend, 231 A.2d 292 (Pa. 1967) (taking of
employment sufficient consideration to support restrictive covenant).
59. See, e.g., Super Maid Cook-Ware Corp v. Hamil, 50 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 677 (1931) (employment that did not guarantee one day of
regular work or pay not sufficient consideration for restrictive covenant); Ridley v.
Krout, 180 P.2d 124 (Wyo. 1947) (same). But see Records Ctr., Inc. v.
Comprehensive Management, Inc., 525 A.2d 433 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
(employment relationship, not written contract, is all that has to be shown).
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., Markson Bros. v. Redick, 66 A.2d 218 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1949)
(changing an employee's status from at-will to week-to-week not sufficient
consideration).
62. See, e.g., George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, 347 A.2d 311 (Pa. 1975)
(noting that $1.00 nominal consideration is insufficient).
63. See, e.g., Tasty Box Lunch Co. v. Kennedy, 121 So.2d 52 (Fla. App. Ct.
1960); see also Knight, Vale & Gregory v. McDaniel, 680 P.2d 448 (Wash. App. Ct.
1984).
64. See, e.g., Schneller v. Hayes, 28 P.2d 273 (Wash. 1934); Bilec v. Auburn &
Assoc., Inc. Pension Trust, 588 A.2d 538 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Stevenson v.
Parsons, 384 S.E.2d 291 (N.C. App. Ct. 1989); Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E. 2d 543 (N.C.
App. Ct. 1944).
65. See, e.g., Insulation Corp. of America v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995) ($2,000 annual raise plus change from at-will to term employment
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position.67 Continued employment for a substantial period of time
may be adequate consideration for a covenant. 68
A change in the terms of the continued employment, for
example, from employment at-will to termination for cause, is
adequate consideration for a restrictive covenant.69  Giving an
employee an ownership interest in the business is also adequate
consideration to support a covenant.7" However, if an employee has
an existing right to receive a benefit, the employer cannot condition
that right on an employee's willingness to sign a covenant.71
C. Restriction's Reasonableness
A restrictive covenant will not always be enforced even though
it is written to safeguard a protectible employer business interest
72
and is supported by sufficient consideration. 7  The covenant's
restrictions must also be reasonable.74
constituted sufficient consideration).
66. See, e.g., Davis & Warde, Inc. v. Tripodi, 616 A.2d 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (sufficient consideration existed where employees were offered continued
employment, new employment responsibilities, cash payment, new severance
package, and guarantee of certain job benefits).
67. See, e.g., Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324
(9th Cir. 1980) (change in employment status required to enforce restrictive
covenant); Maintenance Specialties, Inc. v. Gottus, 314 A.2d 279 (Pa. 1974)
(same); Jacobson & Co. v. International Env't Corp., 235 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1967)
(same).
68. See Rollins v. American State Bank, 487 N.E.2d 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986);
Ranch Hand Foods, Inc. v. Polar Pak Foods, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985); see also McRand, Inc. v. Van Beelen, 486 N.E.2d 1306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
But see Bilec v. Auburn & Assocs., Inc. Pension Trust, 588 A.2d 538 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991) (mere continued employment is not adequate consideration).
69. See, e.g., Rogers v. Runfola & Assoc., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 540 (Ohio Ct. App.
1991) (promise to terminate at-will employee only for cause sufficient
consideration).
70. See, e.g., Wainwright's Travel Serv., Inc. v. Schmolk, 500 A.2d 476 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985) (finding stock purchase agreement sufficient consideration to
support restrictive covenant).
71. See, e.g., Mason Corp. v. Kennedy, 244 So.2d 585 (Ala. 1971) (restrictive
covenant's enforcement refused because the employer required the employee to
sign the covenant to receive a lump sum, profit-sharing benefit to which the
employee was already entitled).
72. See infra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
74. See DECKER, COVENANTS, supra note 8, at § 3.4. The criteria used to
determine whether the restrictive covenant is reasonable is set forth in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS:
Ancillary Restraints on Competition
(1) A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is
ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in
restraint of trade if
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Reasonableness generally relates to the geographic area in
which competition or employment is restricted, as well as the
restriction's time limit. The inquiry into the reasonableness of the
covenant's restrictions as they relate to geographic area and time
limit has three components. These are:
1. Whether the restriction is greater than necessary to
protect the employer's legitimate business interests;
2. Whether the restriction is oppressive to the employee; and
3. Whether the restriction is injurious to the general public.75
A restriction's reasonableness depends on the scope of the
employer's business and the nature of the employee's position. The
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee's legitimate
interest, or
(b) the promisee's need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and
the likely injury to the public.
(2) Promises imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid transaction or
relationship include the following:
(b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with his
employer or other principal; ...
RESTATEMENT, supra note 53, § 188.
An explanation of "reasonableness" as it relates to non-competition
restrictive covenants appears at Unreasonableness of Covenant Not To Compete,
20 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 705, § 3 (Law Co-op. 1993):
In employment cases, reasonableness breaks down into three issues: (1)
whether the restraint is reasonable as to the employer, (2) whether the restraint is
reasonable as to the employee, and (3) whether the restraint is reasonable as to the
public. More elaborately, the questions are usually propounded as follows:
" Is the restraint reasonable in the sense that it is no greater than
necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate interest?
* Is the restraint reasonable in the sense that it is not unduly harsh
and oppressive on the employee?
* Is the restraint reasonable in the sense that it is not injurious to
the public?
Those states which have adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS view perform a balancing test in which they consider the interests of
the employer, the employee, and the public in determining whether they will
enforce the covenant are: Central Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d
513 (S.D. 1996); Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531 (Wyo. 1993);
Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain, 599 So.2d 971, 975 (Miss. 1992); Brockley v.
Lozier Corp., 488 N.W.2d 556, 563 (Neb. 1992); Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc.
v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Tenn. 1984); Insulation Corp. of America v.
Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 733 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Bertotti v. C.E. Shepherd Co.,
Inc. 752 S.W.2d 648, 657 (Tex. App. Ct. 1988); Gomez v. Chua Medical Corp., 510
N.E.2d 191 (Ind. App. 1987); Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc. v. Douglas, 727
S.W.2d 426, 433 (Mo. App. 1987); Mattison v. Johnston, 730 P.2d 286, 288 (Ariz.
App. 1986).
75. See Hamer Holding Group, Inc. v. Elmore, 560 N.E.2d 907 (I11. App. Ct.
1990) (customer list compiled from information on file with secretary of state, by
expending $60,000, was not a trade secret).
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restriction's time length"6 and the geographic area" encompassed by
the restriction are generally involved in this analysis. However,
increasingly when an employee is terminated courts also balance
the employer's protectible business interest that the employer seeks
to safeguard against the employee's important interest of being able
to earn a livelihood in his or her chosen profession, career, trade,
occupation, etc."8
III. Enforcement Approaches
To determine a restrictive covenant's enforceability, courts use
four approaches depending on the jurisdiction. 9  The earliest
approach or the blue pencil test,' was adopted from English law.
Under this test, courts review the covenant's language. If the
unreasonable terms of the covenant are severable from the rest of
the covenant or contract, courts delete the covenant's offensive
part. In theory, the court runs a "blue pencil" through the
covenant's offensive part. If what remains is reasonable, it is
enforced. If not, the covenant is not enforced. The blue pencil test
has been equated to an implied separability clause.
A second method to determine a restrictive covenant's
enforceability involves judicial interpolation of divisibility into the
restrictive covenant's text. Under this approach, the court removes
76. See, e.g., Tyler Enterprises of Elwood, Inc. v. Shafer, 573 N.E.2d 863 (Ill
App. Ct. 1991) (three year restrictive covenant against former general sales
manager found reasonable). But see Boldt Machinery & Tools, Inc. v. Wallace,
366 A.2d 902 (Pa. 1976) (refusing to enforce restrictive covenant's five year time
limit against salesman of industrial machinery).
77. See, e.g., McAlpin v. Cowete Fayett Surgical Associates, P.C., 458 S.E.2d
499 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (restrictive covenant imposing 10-county geographical
restriction on physician was reasonable). But see Magic Fingers, Inc. v. Robins,
206 A.2d 601 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1965) (court refusing to enforce restrictive covenant
that had no geographic limitation).
78. See All-Pak, Inc. v. Johnston, 694 A.2d 347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997);
Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d 729; Thermo-Guard, Inc. v. Cochran, 596 A.2d 188 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991).
79. See DECKER, COVENANTS, supra note 8, at § 12.2; Malsberger, COVE-
NANTS, supra note 8.
80. For a general discussion of the blue pencil test's use in the United States,
see Comment, Severability of Employee Covenants Not to Compete, 23 U. CHI. L.
REV. 663, 663-68 (1956). For example, even though Minnesota permits partial
enforcement under the blue pencil test, there is no requirement that the test be
followed. Rather, it is the court's discretion whether to apply it. See, e.g., Klick v.
Crosstown State Bank of Ham Lake, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 85 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(court has discretion whether to apply the blue pencil test based on the case's
facts); see also Lamp v. American Prosthetics, Inc., 379 N.W.2d 909 (Iowa 1986)
(although court may modify restrictive covenant and enforce it to the extent that it
is not unreasonable, the court declined to do so sua sponte).
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the offensive provision, whether or not it could be severed in a
literal, grammatical sense, and rewrites the rest of the covenant.
For example, one court modified an overly broad covenant that
prohibited competition within any state in the United States, except
for Nevada and Arizona.81 Because the several areas of the country
were separately described, the court held that the covenant was
enforceable as to the state of New Jersey. In another case, a broad
restriction was limited to one state.83 In a third case, a covenant's
time limit was modified from ten years to nine months.'
Relying on a third method, courts have refused to modify a
restrictive covenant, judging it only as written. If the covenant is in
any way unreasonable, it is not enforced, even if the offensive
portion were severable. For example, a covenant prohibited an
employee from engaging in a competing business in a variety of
specified areas.85 Although it would have been simple for the court
to delete certain portions of the covenant, it held that the entire
covenant was invalid, because "the restrictive covenant must be
judged as a whole and must stand or fall when so judged."'
In contrast to these judicial approaches, some states employ a
fourth method that operates through statutory prohibitions. Some
state statutes declare certain covenants contrary to public policy
and completely void.' Other states have enacted less restrictive
legislation, in effect codifying the common law.89
81. See Trenton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 43 A. 723, 725-28 (N.J. 1899).
82. See id. at 728.
83. See Mason v. Thomas Briggs Co., 297 S.W. 1106 (Ky. 1927).
84. See Schmidl v. Central Laundry Supply Co., 13 N.Y.S.2d 817, 824-25 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1939).
85. See Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693, 696 (4th Cir. 1955).
86. Id. at 701.
87. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (1984); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§
16601-16602 (West 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
542.33 (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 13-8-2, -2.1 (Michie 1990); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 480-4 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (West 1985); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28.61-.70 (Law. Co-op. 1990); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (Smith
1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-2 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-6 (1987); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217-219 (Supp. 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (1989); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 53-9-8 to -11 (Michie 1990); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 15.03, 15.05 (West Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 1988).
88. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16601-16602.
89. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465.
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IV. Denying Enforcement of Non-Competition Restrictive
Covenants for Employer Termination Reasons Unrelated to a
Protectible Business Interest
Employers terminate employees for a wide variety of reasons,
regardless of whether there exists at-will employment,9° a written
employment relationship subject to termination only for cause, or
something in between. 9' Some terminations occur through no fault
of the employee' or for no reason.93 Other terminations result from
90. See PERRITT, supra note 7, at ch. 1.
91. See DECKER, COVENANTS, supra note 8, at § 6.27. In a written
employment contract, cause may be defined restrictively making it difficult for the
employer to terminate the employee or broadly making it much easier for the
employer to end the employment relationship. See DECKER & FELIX, CONTRACTS,
supra note 6, at §§ 3.76-3.78. Likewise, cause may be left undefined leaving it up to
the factfinder for determination. Where it is left undefined, the following
questions may be appropriate to determine if cause, in fact, exists:
1. Did the employer forewarn the employee orally or in writing of the possible
or probable consequences of the employee's adverse action?
2. Was the employer's rule reasonably related to the orderly, efficient, and safe
operation of the business and the performance that the employer might
reasonably expect of the employee?
3. Did the employer, before administering discipline to the employee, make an
effort to discover whether the employee did in fact violate or disobey an
employer rule or order?
4. Was the employer's investigation conducted fairly and objectively?
5. At the employer's investigation, did the employer's adjudicator obtain
substantial and compelling evidence or proof that the employee was
responsible or at fault as alleged?
6. Has the employer applied its rules, orders, policies, and penalties fairly and
without discrimination to all employees?
7. Was the degree of discipline reasonably related to the seriousness of the
offense and the employee's work performance record with the employer?
See Whirlpool Corp., 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 421 (1972) (Daugherty, Arb.).
A negative response to any question on the above checklist would overturn
the employer's disciplinary action. See also A. KOVEN & S. SMITH, JUST CAUSE:
THE SEVEN TESTS (2d ed. 1992). However, a court may lack authority to review an
employer's determination that just cause existed when the employer reserves for
itself the authority to determine whether there was just cause to discipline or
terminate the employment relationship. See Thomas v. John Deere Corp., 517
N.W.2d 265 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (when the decision that just cause existed was to
be made by the employee's supervisor, the supervisor's superior, and a personnel
representative, no claim for breach of contract could be brought by the employee
as long as the just cause determination was made by these designated persons).
92. See e.g., Ashton Klinger & Associates, P.C. v. Com. Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 74 Pa. Commw. 293, 561 A.2d 841 (1989) (attorneys'
unsatisfactory performance did not constitute willful misconduct to preclude
receipt of unemployment compensation where attorney worked to best of his
ability).
93. See, e.g., Little v. Federal Container Corp., 452 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. 1969)
(contract of stated duration subject to termination if employee's services prove
dissatisfying is without prejudice to employer's right to terminate on grounds other
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employee willful misconduct.' Among these termination reasons
are insubordination, damaging employer property, dishonesty,
theft, fights, gambling, horseplay, off-duty misconduct, unauthor-
ized outside employment, sleeping on-duty, sexual harassment,
substance abuse, and unsatisfactory performance.95 Many of these
termination reasons, however, do not relate to a protectible
employer business interest involving dissemination of confidential
information or competition with the former employer.
Assume an employer has a protectible business interest
justifying a non-competition restrictive covenant's use. This
interest is supported by adequate consideration and its restrictions
relating to time period and geographical area are reasonable. What
effect, if any, should the employer's termination reasons have on
the non-competition covenant's enforceability? If the employer
terminates the employee wrongfully or in bad faith, should the
covenant be enforced? 96 Under these termination circumstances,
the covenant probably should not be enforced because the
employer, not the employee, has breached the employment
agreement and should not be permitted to profit from the breach.
However, if the employee's termination is for a legitimate reason
but does not relate to a protectible employer business interest, what
should the outcome be? This latter issue was reviewed in Insulation
Corp. of America v. Brobston, where the court required an
additional inquiry by limiting a non-competition covenant's
enforceability to terminations involving a protectible employer
business interest. 97
than dissatisfaction constituting cause).
94. Willful misconduct has been considered to mean conduct whereby the
employee desired to bring about the result that followed or at least was aware that
it was substantially certain to follow, so that the employee's desire could be
implied. See King v. Breach, 540 A.2d 976 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988). For example,
stealing the employer's property. See Wysocki v. Commonwealth Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 487 A.2d 71 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (claimant who
was terminated for attempting to take employer's property was guilty of willful
misconduct making him ineligible for unemployment compensation).
95. See generally BNA EDITORIAL STAFF, GRIEVANCE GUIDE (9th ed. 1995);
J. REDEKER, EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (1989).
96. See, e.g., Economy Grocery Stores v. McMenamy, 195 N.E. 747 (Mass.
1935) (court refused to enforce one year restrictive covenant); see also Kroeger v.
Stop & Shop Co., 432 N.E.2d 566 (Mass. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 440 N.E.2d 1175
(Mass. 1982) (restrictive covenant modified).
97. 667 A.2d 729 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
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A. Insulation Corp. of America v. Brobston
Insulation Corp. of America v. Brobston arose out of a trial
court's preliminary injunction enforcing a restrictive covenant's
terms.98 The restrictive covenant had two components. One clause
protected the employer from non-disclosure of confidential inform-
ation while the other clause protected the employer from
non-competition.9
98. See id.
99. See id. at 731. The relevant portion of the restrictive covenant's "non-
disclosure" clause and "non-competition" clause provided as follows:
WHEREAS, Employer is considering changing from a commodity
(anyone can do) type of product to a more specialized high margin
product that is far less dependent on the changes in construction activity;
and
WHEREAS, Employer is about to purchase equipment and computer
software to design and cut Employer's products with the assistance of
computer assisted design (CAD), and the resulting system requires
extensive knowledge and training; and
WHEREAS, Employer finds it necessary and essential to give specialized
education and training to certain employees; and
WHEREAS, Employee will be the recipient of information with respect
to the operation of the CAD system, including requirements, design,
setup, pricing and operation, and, also, the identity of customers of
Employer, and Employer's sources of leads for and methods of obtaining
new business, and information and training with respect to various
techniques, procedures, equipment, designs, drawings, plans, engineering
or test data, customer and supplier lists, cost records and other
information used or developed by Employer in carrying out Employer's
business; and
4. The Employee during the term of employment under this Agreement
will have access to and become familiar with various trade secrets,
consisting of formulas, patterns, devises, secret inventions, processes,
sales, earnings, finances and compilations of information, records and
specifications and all other concerns of the Employer, which are owned
by the Employer and which are regularly used in the operation of the
business of the Employer. The Employee shall not disclose any of the
aforesaid trade secrets, directly or indirectly, nor use them in any way,
either during the term of this Agreement or at any time thereafter, except
as required by the Employer in the course of the Employee's
employment for the Employer.
5. On the termination of Employee's employment, for whatever reason
whatsoever, the Employee shall not, directly or indirectly, within three
hundred (300) miles of Allentown, Pennsylvania, enter into or engage
generally in direct competition with the Employer in the business of
manufacturing and/or selling expanded polystyrene insulation or
packaging either as an individual on Employee's own or as a partner or
joint venturer, or as an employee or agent for any person, or as an officer,
director, or shareholder or otherwise for a period of three (3) years after
the date of termination of Employee's employment hereunder.
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The employer manufactured and sold polystyrene packaging,
roofing, and insulation products. °° In October 1982, an employee
was hired. He was forty-seven years old, had worked in the
insulation industry since 1977, and began employment without a
written contract. 1 ' He began his employment as a territory sales
manager, and then moved from national account manager to
general manager in 1 990.'°2
In July, 1992, the employer decided to expand its product line
from commodity or "anyone can do" products into more specializ-
ed products through a Computer-Assisted Design (CAD) system. 103
Prior to purchasing the CAD system, the employer demanded that
the employee and certain other employees sign employment
contracts containing restrictive covenants or be terminated."
On July 24, 1992, the employee signed the employment
contract, which contained a restrictive covenant. The covenant
contained two components: a non-disclosure clause and a
non-competition clause."'O
The consideration for the employee's signing the restrictive
covenant was a $2,000.00 increase in base salary and receipt of
proprietary information concerning the CAD system, customers,
and pricing. 'O In October, 1992, the employee became vice
president of special products"O This position included respon-
sibility for sales of CAD system products as well as commodity
products." The promotion to vice president of special products
was, however, not part of the consideration for his agreement to be
bound by the restrictive covenant."0
Over the next year, the employee failed to file sales calls and
expense account reports properly."' The employee also failed to
make a satisfactory number of overnight sales calls."2  Of the
Id. at 731-32 (citing the Employment Contract at 1-5).
100. See id. at 731.
101. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d at 731.
102. See id.
103. See id. In an "anyone can do" product was described by the employee as a
type of product that is a genuine product, available as a commodity item in
lumberyards. See id. at 731 n.1.
104. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d at 731.
105. See id.
106. See id.; see also supra note 99.
107. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d at 732.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id at 732 n.2, 733.
111. See id. at 732.
112. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d at 732.
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fourteen accounts in his territory, only three showed growth."3 The
others showed either flat or decreasing sales."4
On August 13, 1993, the employer terminated the employee."5
On December 8, 1993, the employee was hired by Foam Plastics of
New England. 16 Foam Plastics was the employer's competitor and
was aware that the employee had signed the former employer's
restrictive covenants."7
On December 17, 1993, the former employer sought injunctive
relief against the employee to enjoin him from disclosing
proprietary information and to restrain him from competing. 8 The
trial court enforced the entire restrictive covenant."9 It enjoined
the employee under the non-disclosure covenant from dissem-
inating the employer's trade secrets and under the non-competition
covenant from competing with the employer within three hundred
miles of Allentown, Pennsylvania, for a period of two years from
the employee's termination date. 2 The court modified the time
restriction of the non-competition covenant, however, from three
years to two years."' As a result, the employee was placed on leave
without pay by his new employer.'22
On appeal, the employee contended that the non-competition
restrictive covenant was unenforceable because it bore no
reasonable relationship to the employer's protectible business
interests." The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed in part with
the employee. It affirmed the trial court's preliminary injunction
regarding the non-disclosure covenant, however, it reversed the
trial court's injunctive enforcement of the non-competition
covenant against the employee.
The appellate court found that injunctive enforcement of the
non-disclosure covenant provided the relief necessary to protect the
employer's legitimate business interests.12' This covenant restrained





117. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d at 732.
118. See id.
119. See id at 732.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 732 n.3.
122. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d at 732.
123. See id. at 733.
124. See id. at 738.
125. See id.
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employer's trade secrets consisting of formulae, patterns, devices,
secret inventions, processes, sales, earnings, finances, compilation
of information, records, and specifications owned or used by the
employer or acquired by the employee during his employment.
12 6
The part of the injunction enforcing this covenant applied
regardless of future employment, whether it was with a competitor
or outside the insulation industry entirely.'27
While the trial court did modify the restrictive covenant, it did
not consider the circumstances surrounding the employee's term-
ination and whether they related to a protectible employer business
interest."2 It simply concluded that imposing an additional burden
on the employee by enforcing the non-competition covenant would
tip the balance of reasonableness away from safeguarding the
employer's protectible business interests to affecting the
employee's ability to earn a living.'29
The appellate court held that the trial court's enforcement of
the non-competition covenant constituted error where the
employee was terminated for unsatisfactory work performance."
The former employer made a determination that the employee was
of no worth and no threat to warrant the non-competition
covenant's enforcement to safeguard a protectible employer
business interest.3
B. Significance
The issue for the Pennsylvania Superior Court's determination
in Insulation Corp. of America v. Brobston, was whether enforce-
ment of a non-competition restrictive covenant in light of the
employee's termination for unsatisfactory performance was reason-
able to safeguard a protectible employer business interest.
32
126. See id.
127. Id. See Morgan's Home Equipment Corp. v. Martucci, 136 A.2d at 838,
846-47 (Pa. 1957) (although former employees had obtained confidential
information, the employer was adequately protected by a decree enjoining
disclosure of the information, thereby preventing the former employees from
benefitting from their customer contacts and knowledge; however, the "non-
competition" restrictive covenants were not reasonably necessary for the
employer's protection and constituted an undue hardship upon the former
employees).
128. See id. at 848 (where the restrictive covenant places limitations more
extensive than is necessary to protect employer, a court of equity may grant
enforcement limited to those portions).
129. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d at 737-38.
130. See id. at 736-37.
131. Seeid.at 735.
132. See id. at 729.
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Non-competition covenants are generally subject to a more
stringent test of reasonableness than covenants ancillary to the sale
of a business.133 This additional scrutiny arises from a historical
reluctance of courts to enforce any contracts in restraint of free
trade, particularly where they restrain an individual from earning a
living." 4 This close scrutiny also stems from a recognition of the
inherently unequal bargaining positions of employee and employer
when entering into restrictive covenants.135
The determination of whether a restrictive covenant is
reasonable and enforceable requires a case by case analysis. It
requires a court to consider all the facts and circumstances.36 A
covenant found to be reasonable in one case may be unreasonable
in another because of changed circumstances.
137
For a non-competition restrictive covenant to be enforceable,
it must relate to the employment contract, be supported by
adequate consideration, and be reasonably limited in both time and
territory.138 Issues considered when determining the harshness of
and oppression resulting from a non-competition covenant's
enforcement include:
[1.] What is the situation of employee and his [or her]
family?
[2.] What is the employee's capacity?
[3.] Is the employee handicapped or disabled in any way?
[4.] What effect will the restraint have on the employee's
life?
[5.] Will [the restraint] deprive him [or her] of the
opportunity of supporting himself [or herself] and his
[or her] family in reasonable comfort?
[6.] Will it force him or her to give up the work for which he
[or she] is best trained or be expatriated?
[7.] What are the business conditions?
[8.] Is there prevailing unemployment [in the area]?
133. See Thermo-Guard, Inc. v. Cochran, 596 A.2d 188, 193 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991).
134. See Morgan's Home Equipment Corp., 136 A.2d at 846; see also DECKER,
COVENANTS, supra note 8, at § 2.15.
135. See Reading Aviation Serv., Inc. v. Bertolet, 311 A.2d 628, 630 (Pa. 1973).
136. See Jacobson & Co. v. International Envtl. Corp., 235 A.2d 612, 619 (Pa.
1967).
137. See id.
138. See Davis & Warde, Inc. v. Tripodi, 616 A.2d 1384, 1387 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992), appeal denied, 637 A.2d 284 (Pa. 1993); Bilec v. Auburn & Assoc., Inc.
Pension Trust, 588 A.2d 538, 542 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 597 A.2d 1150
(Pa. 1991).
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[9.] Was the employment terminable at the employer's will?
[10.] Did the employee work for the employer a very brief
time?
[11.] What were the circumstances of termination of the
employment?
[12.] Did the termination constitute a breach of contract by
employer?
[13.] If not a breach, was it unreasonable?
[14.] What is the character and extent of the consideration
[given to the employee for the covenant]?
139
It is not enough merely to ask the question of whether the
covenant will be oppressive. By its very nature, the test calls for a
searching inquiry of: (1) all the circumstances surrounding the
employment relationship and (2) its termination.4 °
When asked to enforce a non-competition restrictive covenant,
the appellate court in Insulation Corp. found that the "reason for
the termination" must be considered, even if the employer con-
cealed the true reason in the belief that this would help the
employee obtain another job.41 The circumstances under which the
employment relationship is terminated is an important factor in
assessing both the legitimacy of the employer's protectible business
interest and the employee's ability to earn a living.
42
Generally, the determination of reasonableness of time and
territory has involved weighing competing interests. It weighs the
employer's need for protection against the restriction's hardship to
be imposed on the employee.'43 In Insulation Corp., the employee,
139. Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Com. Pl. Ct.
1952) (citations omitted).
140. See Insulation Corp. of America v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995).
141. See id. at 737.
142. See id.
143. See Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 136 A.2d 838, 846 (Pa.
1957); Thermo-Guard, Inc. v. Cochran, 596 A.2d 188, 193 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
These competing interests were explained by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as
follows:
An employee may receive specialized training and skills, and learn the
carefully guarded methods of doing business which are the trade secrets
of a particular enterprise. To prevent an employee from utilizing such
training and information in competition with his former employer, for the
patronage of the public at large, restrictive covenants are entered into.
They are enforced by the courts as reasonably necessary for the
protection of the employer. See Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v.
Witter, 62 Ohio L.Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685, 694-99, 708-711 (1952); 3
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 934c (5th Ed. 1941). A general
covenant not to compete, however, imposes a greater hardship upon an
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a ten year employee, was privy to certain confidential corporate
information, including overhead costs, profit margin, dealer
discounts, customer pricing, marketing strategy, and customer
contract terms.'" This information was entitled to be protected by
the employer through the non-disclosure restrictive covenant.45
The employee was terminated because he failed to increase
sales, take overnight sales trips, develop business, and report sales
calls and expenses.146 The employee's termination for these reasons
merited further scrutiny to determine whether a protectible em-
ployer business interest warranted enforcing the non-competition
restrictive covenant."'
The employment contract's preamble disclosed that the
employer's purpose in requiring the employee to enter into the
non-competition restrictive covenant was to protect the new
Computer-Assisted Design (CAD) technology the employer
planned to acquire to create a niche market and obtain a
competitive advantage over other insulation suppliers by producing
a more specialized higher margin product.' However, the
employee was never given the extensive knowledge and training by
the employer necessary to operate the CAD system. His testimony
that he never received the training went unrebutted .
The employee admittedly possessed confidential customer
sales and profit margin information that related to the system. A
employee than upon a seller of a business. An employee is prevented from
practicing his trade or skill, or from utilizing his experience in the
particular type of work with which he is familiar. He may encounter
difficulty in transferring his particular experience and training to another
line of work, and hence his ability to earn a livelihood is seriously
impaired. Further, the employee will usually have few resources in
reserve to fall back upon, and he may find it difficult to uproot himself
and his family in order to move to a location beyond the area of potential
competition with his former employer. Contrariwise, the mobility of
capital permits the business man to utilize his funds in other localities and
in other industries.
Morgan's Home Equip. Corp., 136 A.2d at 846 (emphasis added).
144. Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d 729.
145. See Morgan's Home Equip. Corp., 136 A.2d at 842 (confidential customer
data entitled to protection as trade secret under controlling common law) (citing
Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 86 A. 688 (Pa. 1913)); Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. v.
Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1230 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (en banc)
(inventory data, projections, details, unit costs, product profit margin data are
protectible trade secrets)).
146. SeeInsulation Corp., 667 A.2d 729.
147. See id. at 737.
14& See id.
149. See id.at 735.
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close reading of the contract revealed that this information was
adequately protected by the non-disclosure restrictive covenant9
At the trial court, the employer sought and received injunctive
enforcement of both the non-disclosure and non-competition
restrictive covenants.'51 A non-disclosure covenant is not limited by
the reasonableness criteria applicable to non-competition
covenants. "2 Because the employer was granted relief for the
confidential information by the trial court, enforcement of the
non-competition covenant was unnecessary to protect its interests
and unfairly oppressive to the employee's ability to earn a living
where the employer deemed the employee worthless through
termination for unsatisfactory performance.
The appellate court noted that there was a significant factual
distinction between the hardship imposed by a non-competition
restrictive covenant's enforcement on an employee who voluntarily
leaves the employer and the hardship imposed upon an employee
who is terminated for failing to do the job.' The reason for the
150. See id. at 736.
151. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d at 732.
152. See Bell Fuel Corp. v. Cattolico, 544 A.2d 450, 458 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988),
appeal denied, 554 A.2d 505 (Pa. 1989).
153. Cf.Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d at 739 (Del Sole, J. dissenting).
154. See id. at 735-36. None of the published Pennsylvania court decisions had
previously addressed this issue; rather, the balance of the published decisions were
under the standard set forth in Morgan's Home Equipment Corp. v. Martucci, 136
A.2d 838 (Pa. 1957), where the employee voluntarily terminated the employment
relationship. See Bryant v. Sling Testing and Repair, Inc., 369 A.2d 1164 (Pa.
1977); Boldt Machinery and Tools v. Wallace, 366 A.2d 902 (Pa. 1976) (per
curiam); Sidco v. Aaron, 351 A.2d 250 (Pa. 1976); Girard Investment Co. v. Bello,
318 A.2d 718 (Pa. 1974); Trilog Associates, Inc. v. Famularo, 314 A.2d 287 (Pa.
1974); Bettinger v. Carl Berke & Associates, 314 A.2d 296 (Pa. 1974); Reading
Aviation Services, Inc. v. Bertolet, 311 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1973); Jacobson and Co. v.
International Environment Corp., 235 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1967); Capital Bakers v.
Townsend, 231 A.2d 292 (Pa. 1967); Beneficial Finance Co. of Lebanon v. Becker,
222 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1966); Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 207 A.2d 768
(Pa. 1965); Barb-Lee Mobil Frame Co. v. Hoot, 206 A.2d 59 (Pa. 1965); Spring
Steels, Inc. v. Molloy, 162 A.2d 370 (Pa. 1960); Pa. Funds Corp. v. Vogel, 159 A.2d
472 (Pa. 1960); Robinson Electronic Supervisory Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 154 A.2d 494
(Pa. 1959); Morgan's Home Equipment v. Martucci, 136 A.2d 838 (Pa. 1957);
Davis & Warde v. Tripodi, 616 A.2d 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 637
A.2d 284 (Pa. 1993); Ruffing v. 84 Lumber, Inc., 600 A.2d 545 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991), appeal denied, 610 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1992); Bilec v. Auburn & Assoc., Inc.
Pension Trust, 588 A.2d 538 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1941); appeal denied, 597 A.2d 1150
(Pa. 1991); Harsco Corp. v. Klein, 576 A.2d 1118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Boyce v.
Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co., 580 A.2d 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), appeal denied,
593 A.2d 413 (Pa. 1991); Rollings v. Protective Services, Inc. v. Shaffer, 557 A.2d
413 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Bell Fuel Corp. v. Cattolico, 544 A.2d 450 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988), appeal denied, 554 A.2d 505 (Pa. 1987); Modem Laundry and Dry Cleaning
Services, Inc. v. Farrer, 536 A.2d 408 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Quaker City Engine
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employment relationship's termination is a factor that must be
considered to determine whether enforcement is truly reasonable.
The employer admitted that it sought to conceal its reasons for
terminating the employee.56  Even if that concealment was
intended to help the employee seek employment, it undercut the
reasonableness of the employer's position."7
A salesperson terminated for poor sales performance cannot
reasonably be perceived to pose the same competitive threat to the
employer's protectible business interests as the salesperson whose
performance is not questioned, but who voluntarily resigns to join
another business in direct competition with the employer.' The
Rebuilders, Inc. v. Toscano, 535 A.2d 1083 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Blair Design and
Construction Co., Inc. v. Kalimon, 530 A.2d 1357 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Martin
Industrial Supply Corp. v. Riffert, 530 A.2d 906 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Records
Center, Inc. v. Comprehensive Management, Inc., 525 A.2d 433 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987); Wainwright's Travel Service, Inc. v. Schmolk, 500 A.2d 476 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985); Robert Clifton Associations, Inc. v. O'Connor, 487 A.2d 947 (Pa. Super.
Ct.1985); Gordon Wahls Co. v. Linde, 452 A.2d 4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Peripheral
Dynamics, Inc. v. Holdsworth, 385 A.2d 1354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (per curiam).
155. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d at 737 n.8. Following an exhaustive search
of Pennsylvania case law, the appellate court discovered only a few cases that were
even remotely similar to the circumstances presented here. The court noted that
For example, in Kistler v. O'Brien, 464 Pa. 475, 347 A.2d 311 (1975), the
employee was terminated by his employer and raised the grounds of
wrongful discharge to test the restrictive covenant's reasonableness.
However, the court invalidated the restrictive covenant for failure of
adequate consideration. Further, the basis for the termination was not
discussed. In Maintenance Specialties, Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 314
A.2d 279 (1974), the employee was not terminated, but the employer
filed a complaint alleging the restrictive covenant's breach. In Trilog
Associates, Inc. v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 314 A.2d 287 (1974), one
employee was terminated while two others voluntarily quit. The reason
for the one employee's termination was not discussed. On appeal, the
restrictive covenants were held void due to unlimited time and territory
restraints. In Hayes v. Altman, 424 Pa. 23, 225 A.2d 670 (1967), the
employee was terminated for failing to sign the restrictive covenant.




157. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a similar case stated: "'We are
approaching nearer and nearer to the conclusion [in restraint of trade cases],
although we have not yet reached it, that common honesty is the true public
policy."' Plunkett Chem. Co. v. Reeve, 95 A.2d 925, 927 (Pa. 1953) (quoting
Monongahela River Consolidated Coal and Coke Co. v. Jutte, 59 A. 1088, 1093
(Pa. 1904)).
158. See Jacobson v. International Environment Corp., 235 A.2d 612, 618 (Pa.
1967). The court stated that
only when the novice has developed a certain expertise, which could
possibly injure the employer if unleased competitively, will the employer
begin to think in terms of a restrictive covenant'. . . It is true that a
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failed salesperson is in no better position to injure the employer
competitively than a novice would be. The record demonstrated
that the employee had not acquired any special expertise in CAD
system-produced insulation products, nor had he demonstrated that
his sales skills were a competitive force warranting employer
protection through the non-competition restrictive covenant.159
Where an employee is terminated by an employer for reasons
unrelated to the employer's protectible business interests, this
action clearly suggests an implicit decision on the employer's part
that its competitive business interests are not required to be
protected by the employee. The employer who terminates an
employee for failing to perform deems the employee worthless.
Once the employer makes this determination, the need to protect
itself from the former employee's competition is diminished. The
employee's worth to the employer is presumably insignificant. 6'
When a termination for unsatisfactory performance occurs, it is
unreasonable to permit the employer to retain unfettered control
over that which it has effectively terminated as worthless to safe-
guard its protectible business interests. 6' This conclusion would
remain the same even if it were determined that the employee was
legitimately terminated for economic reasons."' The same reason-
ing would apply under that scenario when an employer determines
that its "bottom-line" is best protected without the employee on the
payroll.' However, one must keep in mind that reasonableness is
determined on a case-by-case basis."'
The circumstances in Insulation Corp. allegedly justified the
determination that a non-competition restrictive covenant's
enforceability should be influenced by economic reality.65
Accordingly, the appellate court found that the circumstances
under which the employment relationship is terminated are an
important factor to consider in assessing both the employer's
protectible business interests and the employee's ability to earn a
living.66 The employer's termination reasons must be reviewed as
restrictive covenant in the novice's contract might well be held to be
unreasonable as applied to the novice who remained a novice.
159. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d at 735.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 735 n.6.
163. See id.
164. See Jacobson v. International Environment Corp., 235 A.2d 612, 619-20
(Pa. 1967).
165. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d at 736.
166. See id. at 736-37. In All-Pak, Inc. v. Johnston, 649A.2d 347, 352 (Pa. Super.
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they relate directly to the employer's protectible business interests
in determining the non-competition covenant's reasonableness.1
67
V. Refining the Court's Standard for Not Enforcing Non-
Competition Restrictive Covenants Where Employee
Terminations are Unrelated to an Employer Protectible
Business Interest
As a result of Insulation Corp., not all employer termination
reasons are sufficient to justify enforcement of non-competition
restrictive covenants where the employer initiates the termination.
If the termination reasons relate directly to the employer's
protectible business interest, the non-competition covenant will be
enforced."6 Where they do not relate to a protectible employer
business interest, the covenant will not be enforced.6 9 This is
similar yet different from those courts who have refused to permit a
non-competition covenant's enforcement when an employee has
been terminated wrongfully or in bad faith. 7°
Ct. 1997), the Pennsylvania Superior Court further explained its decision in
Insulation Corp. as follows:
In Insulation Corp. of America v. Brobston, an employer sought to
enforce a two year restrictive covenant on an employee who had been
fired for poor performance. We held that the fact that the employee was
terminated, rather than quit voluntarily, was an important factor when
considering the enforceability of a restrictive covenant. On the facts in
that case, we determined that it was inequitable for the employer to
obtain an injunction against the employee. IFootnote omitted.] We
emphasized, however, that the reasonableness of enforcing such a
restriction is determined on a case by case basis. Thus, the mere
termination of an employee would not serve to bar the employer's right
to injunctive relief. Where, for instance, an employee intentionally
engaged in conduct that caused his termination, (footnote omitted) the
employer's right to injunctive relief would survive. However, where an
employer terminated an* employee for reasons beyond the employee's
control, the rule announced in Brobston may bar injunctive relief.
167. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d at 735.
168. Cf. id.
169. See id.
170. Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 222-23 (7th Cir. 1983) (a restrictive covenant is
unenforceable when an employee is terminated in bad faith and without cause);
Troup v. Heacock, 367 So.2d 691, 692 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979) (employer unilaterally
breached contract when employer reduced employee's weekly draw from $125.00
to $50.00 and then terminated the employee without reason making restrictive
covenant unenforceable); Frierson v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply Co., 154 So.2d 151
(Miss. 1963) (employee termination that is arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith will
negate restrictive covenant's enforceability); Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, 397 N.E.2d 358, 360 (N.Y. 1979) (where termination is involuntary and
without cause, restrictive covenant will not be enforced); Hopper v. All Pet
Animal Clinic, 861 P.2d 531, 541 (Wyo. 1993) (simple justice requires that to
enforce a restrictive covenant the employer must show good faith for the
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The distinction made in Insulation Corp., between employees
who are terminated and those who resign voluntarily has been
recognized by other courts.71  An employee's resignation in itself
will not negate a restrictive covenant's enforceability. However it is
not impossible that Insulation Corp.'s standard and rationale could
be applied to a resigning employee; i.e., that the employer must
meet the burden of showing that the employee's resignation related
directly to a protectible employer business interest to enforce the
non-competition covenant.
It is entirely foreseeable that in a given situation, an employee
might try to circumvent a non-competition restrictive covenant by
deliberately performing in a poor manner. The employer would
hold out the hope that he or she will be terminated so that a
non-competition restrictive covenant cannot be enforced. In these
situations, the employee should not be permitted to profit from his
or her wrongful acts and the non-competition covenant should be
enforced.
Insulation Corp. goes beyond the rulings of other jurisdictions'
decisions in holding that an involuntary termination not relating to
an employer's protectible business interest, including termination
for economic reasons, should weigh heavily against a non-
competition restrictive covenant's enforcement.' The court held
the covenant unenforceable, even though Insulation Corp.'s
covenant was broadly worded to apply upon termination "for
whatever reason whatsoever."'73
Terminating an employee wrongfully or in bad faith should
prohibit enforcement of a non-competition restrictive covenant.74
Making the employer establish cause for the termination may also
employee's termination); see also Gomez v. Chua Med. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 191
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (failure to establish "a valid reason" or "objective 'cause"' for
termination does not bar enforcement of non-compete covenant).
171. See Ma & Pa, Inc. v. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1984)
(whether an employee is terminated, as distinguished from resigning, is a factor
opposing the grant of an injunction enforcing a non-compete restrictive covenant);
Central Monitoring Service, Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513 (S.D. 1996) (same).
172. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d 729.
173. See id. at 731; see also Frumkes v. Beasley-Reed Broadcasting, 533 So.2d
942 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (employee who resigned was not subject to restrictive
covenant which specified that it became effective only upon termination for
cause); Lee & Associates v. Lee, 570 So.2d 1102 (Fla. Ct. Dist. App. 1990)
(restrictive covenant was expressly conditioned on employee's terminating his
employment voluntarily or being terminated for cause).
174. See, e.g., Rao, 718 F.2d 219 (a restrictive covenant is unenforceable when
an employee is terminated in bad faith and without good cause).
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be appropriate.' Requiring the employer to relate the employee's
termination directly to a protectible employer business interest
may, however, be too broad a standard.176
Not many employee terminations involve a direct protectible
employer business interest. Terminations for protectible employer
business interests are usually limited to when an employer obtains
advance knowledge that the employee is leaving to form a
competing business," when the employee voluntarily leaves to
work for a competitor, when a departing employee induces
co-employees to leave employment,179 when while employed the
employee prepares to steal or steals confidential information, trade
secrets, or inventions,"s when while employed the employee
discloses confidential information, trade secrets, or inventions to
others,' or when the employee embezzles employer funds.'
By separating the restrictive covenant's non-disclosure
covenant from the non-competition covenant, the appellate court in
Insulation Corp. arrived at a conclusion not reflected in the work-
place's reality. " Allowing the employee to work for a competitor
because the employer's termination reasons did not relate to a
protectible business interest and believing that the employee will
abide by the non-disclosure covenant, does not take into con-
sideration the employment relationship's dynamics. Enforcement
of the non-competition covenant is essential to protect the
employer's non-disclosure interest. Both covenants work hand-in-
hand to safeguard the employer's protectible business interest by
175. See, e.g. Sherman v. Pfeferkorn, 135 N.E. 568 (Mass. 1922) (lawful
termination by an employer in an at-will employment setting allows for restrictive
covenant's enforcement).
176. SeeInsulation Corp., 667 A.2d 729.
177. See, e.g. Arnold's Ice Cream Co. v. Carlson, 330 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (while still employed forming competing ice cream business).
178. See, e.g., Unitel Corp. v. Decker, 731 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)
(court issued temporary injunction enforcing restrictive covenant against former
employees and restraining new employer from interfering with covenant).
179. See, e.g., Frederick Chwid & Co. v. Marshall Leeman & Co., 326 F. Supp.
1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (interference with contractual relationships where former
employees attempted to solicit employees to leave former employer).
180. See, e.g., Insurance Field Serv., Inc. v. White & White Inspection and
Audit Serv., 384 So.2d 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (appropriating customer lists
and soliciting employer's customers while still employed).
181. See, e.g., In re Hallahan, 936 F.2d 1496 (7th Cir. 1991) (solicitation of
customers protected as trade secret prohibited against former employees and new
employer).
182. See, e.g., Hlubeck v. Beeler, 9 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1943).
183. See Insulation Corp. of America v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995).
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limiting unfair employer competition and improper competitor
advantages. One covenant without the other does not suffice in
most employment situations.
The harm that the non-competition restrictive covenant was
intended to protect; namely, working for a competitor, has been
impliedly sanctioned through Insulation Corp.'s broad standard.'
As the dissent asks, what is to prevent an employee secretly
recruited by a competitor from purposely trying to be terminated,
rather than resigning, then working for the competitor free of the
covenant's constraints?185  Likewise, once the employee begins
working for the competitor it is often difficult, if not impossible, to
prevent the harm that the court has permitted. In reality, the
employee will be under considerable pressure to reveal confidential
information to effectively perform the new position's duties. More
importantly, the competitor in all likelihood would not have hired
the employee if it had not thought that it could benefit from the
former employer's confidential data. This is the attractiveness that
the employee brings to the new employer for which the new
employer hopes to obtain a competitive advantage. Not allowing
the employee to work for the competitor in the first place prevents
this harm to the former employer.
Insulation Corp. implies that a "Chinese Wall" or an
impenetrable barrier" 6 will be created between the employee and
the competitor preventing confidential information from being
disclosed."8 The appellate court suggests that the former employer
will have an appropriate remedy through an injunction if the
disclosure occurs. This assumption is far from the reality that
occurs daily in the workplace. The employee and the competitor
will find a surreptitious way to obtain and convey the former
employer's confidential information in a manner that the former
employer will not be able to readily ascertain to prevent injury until
it is too late.
Instead of looking into the employer's protectible business
interests as they relate to the employee's termination, the court
should examine: (1) how the employee's duties relate to the non-
competition covenant at the time of termination and (2) the
employer's reasons for originally requiring the non-competition
covenant. When the employer has a protectible business interest in
184. Seeid.
185. See id. at 739 (Del Sole, J., dissenting).
186. See 1 THE WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY 356 (C.L. BARNHART & R.K.
BARNHART, eds., 1988).
187. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d 729.
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initially requiring the non-competition covenant, whether before
employment commences or during the employment relationship,
and the employee's duties relate directly to these protectible
business interests, the employer should only be required to
establish a supportable reason for the employee's termination. For
example, when an employee is privy to certain confidential
corporate information, customer pricing, marketing strategy, and
customer contract terms through the employee's duties at the time
of termination, the non-disclosure covenant as well as the non-
competition covenant should be enforced as long as a legitimate
non-arbitrary, non-capricious, and non-discriminatory termination
reason exists. Both these covenants work hand-in-hand to safe-
guard the employer's protectible business interests. One cannot be
readily separated from the other. Any supportable reason for the
termination should be sufficient so long as it is not arbitrary,
capricious, discriminatory, wrongful, or in bad faith. This standard
would relate more closely to what other courts have decided
regarding a covenant's enforceability where a wrongful or bad faith
termination has occurred.' It is a more realistic standard applic-
able to actual business situations that can be applied to employee
resignations, terminations, and where employees attempt to
compete with their former employer.
When the employer meets this standard, the employer should
have the right to expect the restrictive covenant's non-competition
clause's enforcement, provided all of the other factors for a valid
covenant are met.89 If the employer meets the standard, it reflects
188. See, e.g., Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1983) (a restrictive covenant is
unenforceable when an employee is terminated in bad faith and without cause);
Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, 861 P.2d 531, 545-48 (Wyo. 1993) (simple justice
requires that to enforce a restrictive covenant the employer must show good faith
for the employee's termination); Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
397 N.E.2d 358 (N.Y. 1979) (where termination is involuntary and without cause,
restrictive covenant will not be enforced); Frierson v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply Co.,
154 So.2d 151, 155 (Miss. 1963) (employee termination that is arbitrary, capricious,
or in bad faith will negate restrictive covenant's enforceability); Troup v. Heacock,
367 So.2d 691, 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (employer unilaterally reduced
employee's weekly draw from $125.00 to $50.00 and then terminated the employee
without reason making restrictive covenant unenforceable); see also Gomez v.
Chua Medical Corp., 510 N.E.2d 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (failure to establish a
valid reason or objective cause for termination does not bar enforcement of non-
compete restrictive covenant).
189. See Nalle Clinic Co. v. Parker, 399 S.E. 2d 363, 365 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(to be enforceable, the former employer must show that the restrictive covenant is:
(1) in writing; (2) made part of an employment contract; (3) based upon
reasonable consideration; (4) reasonable both as to time and territory; and (5) not
against public policy). Where the employee's duties relate directly to the
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the employment situation's realty. The employee's duties relate
directly to the employer's protectible business interest. It also
supports the original consideration for the covenant; i.e., initial
employment, extra money, a new benefit, etc. A higher standard
than a supportable reason should not be required to enforce a non-
competition covenant upon termination. To find otherwise, may
provide employees with an unnecessary windfall.
A review of the facts of Insulation Corp. indicates that by
applying this revised standard that the non-competition restrictive
covenant could have been enforced against the employee. "9 The
employee's duties at the time the covenant was entered into and at
termination related directly to the employer's protectible business
interests and the employer's termination reasons were not
arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, wrongful, or in bad faith.'91
Insulation Corp. suggests that unless an employee voluntarily
resigns, a non-competition restrictive covenant will not be open to
challenge unless the employer terminates the employee for a reason
that directly relates to the employer's protectible business
interest."9 To enforce the non-competition covenant, the employer
may almost have to establish an employee's willful misconduct.
Merely beginning work for a competitor in itself after a termination
may now not be sufficient to warrant the non-competition
covenant's enforcement.
Until Insulation Corp.'s standard is refined, an additional
choice may be still available to employers. At the time employment
commences, during employment, or at termination, the employer
could offer the employee an additional benefit to observe a
non-competition restrictive covenant. This benefit would have to
be something the employee was already not entitled to receive,193
for example, an additional monetary payment above and beyond
any normal severance that might be owed the employee after
employer's business interest the court may still, however, want to review the
reasonableness of the time and territory limitations. It is entirely possible that
these limitations should be different or perhaps less stringent than when the
employee leaves to work for a competitor. Perhaps non-competition covenants
should be drafted to reflect these different factual situations by including varying
time and territory limitations.
190. See Insulation Corp., 667 A.2d 729 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See, e.g., Mason Corp. v. Kennedy, 244 So.2d 585 (Ala. 1971) (restrictive
covenant's enforcement refused because the employer required the employee to
sign the covenant to receive a lump sum, profit sharing benefit to which the
employee was already entitled).
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employment ends.194 The benefit should be specifically referenced
as the consideration supporting the non-competition covenant. By
paying for the non-competition, covenant's observance at the time
of hiring, during employment, or at termination, the employer may
support the covenant's enforceability; provided that all other
factors for an enforceable covenant have been met.195 This option,
however, may not be workable. Few employers are willing to give
an employee anything more than what was owed when a
termination occurs.
VI. Conclusions
Insulation Corp. of America v. Brobston, has added an
additional inquiry for scrutinizing a non-competition restrictive
covenant. In Pennsylvania, as well as in other jurisdictions where
this additional inquiry is adopted,'" employers will face an almost
insurmountable hurdle in restricting a former employee's com-
petition when the employer takes the initiative to terminate the
employment relationship. Not only must the employer sustain its
burden of showing a protectible business interest, valid consider-
ation, and the reasonableness of restrictions relating to geographic
area and time,'" but it must now also establish that its reason for
termination involves a protectible employer business interest.9 In
most cases, this will be difficult, if not impossible.
In effect, Pennsylvania has found that a non-competition
restrictive covenant will be enforced only in a very limited case
involving termination for employee misconduct directly relating to
the employer's protectible business interest. Other employer
business interests are not sufficient."9 The misconduct must relate
directly to a protectible employer business interest.200 Generally,
194. See, e.g., Davis & Warde, Inc. v. Tripodi, 616 A.2d 1384, 1388 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (sufficient consideration existed where employees were offered
continued employment, new employment responsibilities, cash payment, new
severance package, and guarantee of certain job benefits).
195. See Nalle Clinic Co. v. Parker, 399 S.E.2d 363, 365 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (to
be enforceable, the former employer must show that the restrictive covenant is: (1)
in writing; (2) made part of an employment contract; (3) based upon reasonable
consideration; (4) reasonable both as to time and territory; and (5) not against
public policy).
196. See, e.g., Central Monitoring Service, Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513
(S.D. 1996).
197. See Nalle Clinic Co., 399 S.E. 2d at 365.




most employer terminations do not rise to this high standard
whether or not a restrictive covenant is involved.
Employers must be aware that only in the most limited
circumstances will their non-competition interests be enforced
where Insulation Corp.'s standard is used.20 ' To safeguard its
interests, an employer may have to offer the employee some
additional benefit at the time of hiring, during employment, or at
termination to protect its non-competition interests. This
additional consideration may convince a court to enforce the non-
competition covenant; provided that all other factors for a valid
covenant are present.
The better course may be for Pennsylvania courts to refine
Insulation Corp's standard with a more realistic one. The refined
standard should equate to the business world's reality by weighing
the employee's duties at the time the non-competition covenant
was entered into and at termination against the employer's
protectible business interests on a case-by-case basis taking into
consideration whether the employee's termination was arbitrary,
capricious, discriminatory, wrongful, or in bad faith.
Ultimately, the court must balance the employee's and the
employer's competing interests, for which there can be no
mathematical formula. It is impossible to lay down any general
rule. Each case must be determined on its own particular facts.
Broadly speaking, it is the territorial scope and duration, the nature
of the business or profession involved, including the employee's
position and duties, and the public's interests in the employee being
able to continue in that field while not injuring the employer's
protectible business interest that must be considered.
201. See id. at 729.
202. See Nalle Clinic Co., 399 S.E. 2d at 365.
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